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University of Warwick, United Kingdom 
 
Charles Clarke, the UK's education secretary from 2002 to 2004, once asked: "Should we 
enable more of the best researchers to focus on research, and develop a more 
professional teaching force for universities specialising in teaching?" The drift of research 
funding decisions in British universities since then has been to concentrate resources on a 
few key institutions that already command the bulk of research finance. We have been told 
that world-class research requires "critical mass", and this is to be found in the "golden 
triangle" formed by Oxford, Cambridge, and London; those institutions elsewhere that do 
not have critical mass would be better left without any research funding at all than 
encouraged to continue to waste national resources on the small-scale, low-value projects 
that are the only kind of work they are capable of. 
 
Is there critical mass in research? How big is it? These are essentially factual questions; 
no doubt the truth varies, depending on whether we are talking about art history or particle 
accelerators. In any case I do not claim to know the answer. But I am thoroughly familiar 
with the question, which has been asked before. In my own research I have studied how 
government officials in the USSR allocated scarce funding among competing research and 
development projects in Soviet aero engineering in the 1930s and 1940s2. What we find is 
that, in the secret military core of a command system dominated by a harsh dictatorship, 
nobody was able to make a lasting decision about the best way to organise research. On 
one side were proponents of competition. They believed that the right framework within 
which good ideas for the future of aerospace could best emerge and be most easily 
spotted and selected for further development was to spread the limited funding available 
over many projects. Many would fail but a few would succeed and that would be enough. 
On the other side were the advocates of concentration. They found the waste and 
duplication of competitive funding unacceptable. An advantage of the planned economy, 
they argued, was its potential for bigger projects that could be controlled more tightly from 
the centre: in short, a potential for "critical mass". 
 
                                            
1 Editors' note: Professor Mark Harrison was not present at the workshop. However, his short note, written in 
July 2003 in the context of a national debate on university funding in the UK, remains topical. We thank him 
for granting us permission to include it in this compilation.  
2 For results see Harrison (2003), “The Political Economy of a Soviet Military R&D Failure: Steam Power for 
Aviation, 1932 to 1939”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 178-212; Harrison (2005), "A Soviet 
Quasi-Market for Inventions: Jet Propulsion, 1932 to 1946",  Research in Economic History, Vol. 23, pp. 1-
59. 
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The result was an institutional cycle. In the first phase of the cycle, competition ruled. 
Soviet funding officials would announce a new mission, for example, to build a new type of 
engine. Many hopeful designers would set out their research proposals. Behind closed 
doors they lobbied and negotiated for funding; sometimes they even diverted funding from 
an existing project to a new one to get a head start and win some credibility. It was hard 
for officials to decide who had the best chance of success so the cash was shared out 
among many. As the work got under way the projects already funded tended to attract 
further financing more or less regardless of results; after all, by now money had already 
been committed and it became hard for funding officials to cut off projects they had 
authorised previously without looking bad because they had nothing to show for it. At the 
same time new technological possibilities began to emerge from the work already done so 
still more projects were designated and authorised. Funding obligations multiplied. At a 
certain point the higher Soviet authorities lost patience with rising expenses and lack of 
results, and announced a turn to "critical mass". The problem, they declared, was that 
money had been scattered over too many small-scale, low-value efforts; there was a need 
to concentrate efforts and focus them more narrowly. The second phase began. Who 
would lose funding? Some designers fought back: they lobbied defensively to protect their 
funding, or they acted aggressively to try to gobble up the organisations of other designers 
in a weaker position. In the outcome, however, judgements had to be made and funding 
removed from those projects judged less successful, which were terminated; the money 
saved could then be concentrated on a smaller number of bigger projects that reflected a 
narrower mission and more sharply defined priorities. 
 
In the process research monopolies were created that went on to behave like monopolies: 
they consumed resources, increased costs, and restricted output. Moreover, in the rush to 
rationalise, the officials in charge of funding generally made some mistakes. They would 
have liked to curtail only bad projects and save the good ones, but they often made bad 
decisions, sometimes out of ignorance or myopia, sometimes because they were swayed 
by the influence of designers who were better at lobbying and persuading than at 
organising research. And yes, such people do exist, even among high-minded academics 
at top universities. Once it was realised that the concentration drive had gone wrong the 
arguments in favour of competition and pluralism tended to be rediscovered. The cycle 
began again. 
 
Of course there are some differences between the cycle that we find at work in the Soviet 
command system under Stalin and the working of our own research councils and 
department of education under Charles Clarke. In Britain today no one is shot or 
imprisoned for a mistaken funding decision or a faulty design. Personal consequences 
aside, however, the parallels are remarkably similar. The underlying reason is that in both 
cases we are dealing with research for the value of which there is no good market test, but 
there is no good bureaucratic test either. 
 
I predict, therefore, that five or ten years from now another education secretary will 
discover that today's policy of concentrating research funding in pursuit of "critical mass" 
was mistaken, or at least was taken too far. The monopolistic research giants of the 
golden triangle will receive stinging criticisms for their lethargy, bureaucracy, and capacity 
to absorb funding without giving results. There will be much wisdom after the event. We 
will hear speeches full of regret for the blight that the theory of "critical mass" spread 
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through Britain's higher educational periphery in the first years of the new millennium: the 
emerging research groups in second-rank universities that lost their funding, the small but 
promising centres closed, the individual careers curtailed. Ministers and research council 
chiefs will announce a new era of competition and pluralism, in which funding will be 
spread in small, rationed instalments right through to the periphery of the higher education 
system. 
 
But the new era will again turn out to be shorter than anticipated. Ten or fifteen years from 
now yet another education secretary will be making a speech on – yes: the importance of 
"critical mass"! 
